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INTRODUCTION 
It is a shameful irony that the nation with one of the world’s 
highest concentrations of lawyers does so little to make legal services 
accessible.1  According to the World Justice Project, the United States 
is tied with Uganda for sixty-seventh out of ninety-seven countries in 
access to the justice system and affordability of legal services.2  
“Equal justice under law” is one of America’s most proudly 
                                                                                                                                         
* Ernest W. McFarland Professor of Law and Director of the Center on the Legal 
Profession, Stanford University. 
 1. For research suggesting that the United States ranks first or second among 
countries with advanced economies, see Charles Keckler, Lawyered Up: A Book 
Review Essay, 27 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 57, 73 tbl.1 (2010); America Lawyers: Guilty 
as Charged, ECONOMIST (Feb. 2, 2013). 
 2. WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT RULE OF LAW 
INDEX 2012–2013, at 175 (2013). 
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proclaimed and routinely violated legal principles.  It embellishes 
courthouse doors, but in no way describes what goes on behind them.  
Millions of Americans lack any access to justice, let alone equal 
access.  Over four-fifths of the poor’s legal needs and two- to three-
fifths of the legal needs of middle-income Americans remain unmet.3 
This Article analyzes the causes of the justice gap and identifies the 
most promising responses. Part I explores barriers in the justice 
system, including financial, structural, doctrinal and political obstacles 
to greater access to legal services.  Part II looks at strategies for 
reform, such as self-help and non-lawyer service providers, broader 
rights to counsel in civil cases, more pro bono assistance, unbundled 
services and innovative delivery structures, additional research 
concerning access to justice, and more attention to these issues in law 
schools. 
I.  BARRIERS IN THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
In principle, America is deeply committed to individual rights.  In 
practice, few Americans can afford to enforce them.4  The barriers 
have financial, structural, doctrinal and political dimensions, each of 
which are discussed in turn. 
A. Financial 
Money may not be the root of all evil, but it is surely responsible 
for much of what ails the current legal aid system.  Americans do not 
believe that justice should be for sale, but nor do they want to pay for 
the alternative.  Even before recent budgetary cutbacks, there was 
only one legal aid lawyer per 6415 low-income individuals in the 
United States.5  In some jurisdictions, poor people must wait two 
years before seeing a lawyer for matters not considered an 
emergency, and other jurisdictions exclude such cases altogether.6  
The United States federal government spends slightly more than one 
                                                                                                                                         
 3. For a discussion of legal needs among low-income individuals, see LEGAL 
SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE CURRENT UNMET 
CIVIL NEEDS OF LOW INCOME AMERICANS 1–13 (2009), available at 
http://www.lsc.gov/pdfs/dcoumenting_the_justice_gap_in_america_2009.pdf.  Surveys 
find that between two-fifths and three-quarters of the needs of middle-income 
individuals are unaddressed, with most finding at least half. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3, 79 (2004); Luz E. Herrera, Rethinking Private Attorney 
Involvement in the Delivery of Civil Legal Services for Low and Moderate Income 
Clients, 42 LOY. L. REV. 1, 5 (2009). 
 4. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text. 
 5. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 3, at 21 (as of 2009). 
 6. RHODE, supra note 3, at 13. 
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dollar per person for legal aid.7  At this funding level, not much due 
process is available.  Compared to other advanced economies, 
America spends less per legal aid case and has fewer institutions such 
as advice and ombudsperson agencies to assist with routine needs.8  
As a consequence, more individuals are priced out of the legal system 
than in other comparable countries.  For example, one survey 
reported that in the United States, thirty-eight percent of poor 
individuals and twenty-six percent of middle-income individuals took 
no action in response to a legal problem, compared with five percent 
in England and ten percent in the Netherlands.9  Moreover, the recent 
economic downturn has made a bad situation worse.  High rates of 
unemployment, bankruptcies, foreclosures, and reductions in social 
services created more demands for legal representation at the same 
time that many of its providers have faced cutbacks in their own 
budgets.10  The federal budget for legal aid has been cut by almost a 
fifth since 2010.11  In effect, understaffed and overextended legal 
                                                                                                                                         
 7. The United States population in 2013 was slightly more than 316 million and 
the 2013 federal allocation for legal aid was $340.8 million. LSC Funding, LEGAL 
SERVS. CORP., http://www.lsc.gov/congress/lsc-funding (last visited Mar. 15, 2014); 
United States World and Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/popclock (last visited Mar. 15, 2014). 
 8. For expenditures, see Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A 
Comparative Assessment of the Legal Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 
37 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 129, 148 (2010): Earl Johnson, Jr., Justice For America’s 
Poor in the Year 2020: Some Possibilities Based on Experiences Here and Abroad, 
58 DEPAUL L. REV. 393, 397-98 (2009); Raven Lidman, Civil Gideon as a Human 
Right: Is the U.S. Going to Join Step with the Rest of the Developed World?, 15 
TEMPLE PL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 769, 779 (2006). For a comparison of intermediary 
institutions, see Rebecca Sandefur, The Fulcrum Point of Access to Justice: Legal 
and Nonlegal Institutions of Remedy, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 949, 958, 965 (2009). 
 9. Hadfield, supra note 8, at 139. 
 10. See Emily Savner, Expand Legal Services Now, NAT’L L. J., June 28, 2010 
(reporting increases in demand and seventy-five percent drop in IOLTA funds 
between 2007 and 2009); Need a Lawyer? Good Luck, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2010, at 
A32; Karen Sloan, Perfect Storm Hits Legal Aid, NAT’L L. J., Jan. 3, 2011, at 4  
(noting decline in funds from government IOLTA (Interest on Lawyers Trust Fund 
Accounts), and tight private fundraising climate, together with increased demand for 
services); Erik Eckholm, Interest Rate Drop Has Dire Results for Legal Aid Groups, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2009, at A12 (reporting a thirty percent increase in requests for 
legal aid); see also RICHARD ZORZA, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: ECONOMIC CRISIS 
CHALLENGES, IMPACTS, AND RESPONSES 9 (2009), available at 
http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/accessfair/id/185 (finding that 
a majority of judges reported increase in pro se caseloads, but that thirty-nine percent 
also reported cuts in self- help services budget). 
 11. The budget declined from $420 in 2010 to $340.8 in 2013. Ian Millhiser, 
Budget Cuts Hobble Legal Services for the Poor, THINK PROGRESS (Aug. 20, 2012), 
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2012/08/20/714521/budget-cuts-hobble-legal-services-
for-the-poor. 
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assistance programs are often asked to do more with less.  As a result, 
millions of Americans find that legal protections available in principle 
are inaccessible in practice. 
B. Structural 
A more structural set of problems involves the absence of any 
coherent system for allocating assistance and matching clients with 
the most cost-effective service provider.  Researchers at the 
American Bar Foundation (ABF) recently undertook the first ever 
state-by-state portrait of funding available for civil legal services.12  
They found considerable inequality within and across states.  
“[G]eography is destiny: the services available to people from eligible 
populations who face civil justice problems are determined not by 
what their problems are or the kinds of services they may need, but 
rather by where they happen to live.”13  Georgia offers a 
representative case of the mismatch between supply and demand that 
often underlies the inequality.  Some seventy percent of the state’s 
lawyers are in the Atlanta area, while seventy percent of the poor live 
outside it.14  Six counties have no lawyer and dozens have only two or 
three.15  Moreover, as ABF researchers found, “[l]ittle coordination 
exists for civil legal assistance , and existing mechanisms of 
coordination often have powers only of exhortation and 
consultation.”16  Local legal services programs typically set the 
priorities for who will get services and what kinds of services they 
receive.17  The result is not only resource disparities across 
jurisdictions, but also resource inadequacies in scaling up promising 
programs.18  A related problem is that we lack reliable “empirical 
evidence that would support confident advice to claimants about what 
[form of] assistance would best meet their needs, and . . . the 
coordination and planning that would assure that the right assistance 
is readily available to those who need it.”19 
                                                                                                                                         
 12. See REBECCA SANDEFUR & AARON C. SMYTH, AM. BAR FOUND. ACCESS 
ACROSS AMERICA: FIRST REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE INFRASTRUCTURE MAPPING 
PROJECT (2011). 
 13. Id. at v. 
 14. Ethan Bronner, Right to Lawyer Can Be Empty Promise for Poor, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 15, 2013, at A1, A6. 
 15. Id. at A6. 
 16. SANDEFUR & SMYTH, supra note 12, at v. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Jeanne Charn, Celebrating the “Null” Finding: Evidence-Based Strategies for 
Improving Access to Justice, 122 YALE L.J. 2206, 2216–17 (2013) 
 19. Id. at 2223. 
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The system is also unduly lawyer-centric.  Bar organizations, which 
have been the most powerful voices in the debate over access to 
justice, have seen the solution as more lawyers.  In 2006, the 
American Bar Association (ABA) unanimously adopted a resolution 
urging the provision of “legal counsel as a matter of right at public 
expense to low-income persons in those categories of adversarial 
proceedings where basic human needs are at stake.”20  Many state and 
local bar associations passed similar resolutions.21  These 
organizations have not been similarly enthusiastic about court 
simplification and pro se assistance, and have actively fought self-help 
publications and non-lawyer providers.22  From the profession’s 
perspective, the focus on guaranteeing more lawyers makes obvious 
sense.  But from the standpoint of the public, the objective is more 
access to justice, not necessarily to lawyers. 
In courts that handle housing, bankruptcy, small claims, and family 
matters, parties without attorneys are often less the exception than 
the rule.23  Yet they must cope with procedures designed by and for 
lawyers.  Although courts have made increasing attempts to 
accommodate these unrepresented litigants, one national survey 
found only eleven states with comprehensive programs to help pro se 
parties.24  Many of the services available, such as self-help computer 
kiosks, are unusable by those who need help most: low-income 
litigants with limited technological competence and English language 
skills.25  All too often, parties confront procedures of excessive and 
                                                                                                                                         
 20. ABA, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (105-REVISED) 1 (2010), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_ 
indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_105_revised_final_aug_2010.authcheckdam.pdf 
(quoting ABA  RECOMMENDATION 112A (2006)). 
 21. Bar Efforts, COALITION FOR CIV. RIGHT TO COUNS., 
http://www.civilrightocousel.org/advances/bar_efforts (last visited Mar. 15, 2014). 
 22. For historical examples of opposition, see Deborah L. Rhode, Professionalism 
in Perspective: Alternative Approaches to Nonlawyer Practice, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 701, 705 (1996).  For the bar’s current enforcement efforts, see 
Deborah L. Rhode & Lucy Ricca, Unauthorized Practice Enforcement: Protection of 
the Public or the Profession, FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). 
 23. See, e.g., Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: 
What Existing Data Reveal About When Counsel Is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 37, 41–43 (2010) (summarizing reports on representation rates in housing, 
small claims, and family law cases). 
 24. ALAN W. HOUSEMAN, CIVIL LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES: AN UPDATE 
FOR 2007, at 20–21 (2007), available at http://www.clasp.org/publications/civil_ 
legal_aid_2007.pdf. 
 25. For the kind of services available, see Jona Goldschmidt, How Are Courts 
Handling Pro Se Litigants? 82 JUDICATURE 13, 20–22 (1998); infra text accompanying 
note 108. 
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bewildering complexity, and forms with archaic jargon.  The United 
States lags behind other nations in providing access to justice through 
less expensive approaches than representation by lawyers.26  For 
example, in the United Kingdom, millions of individuals are assisted 
by Citizens’ Advice Bureaus, which are staffed by trained non-lawyer 
volunteers. 27 
In this country, the result is that only about half of Americans have 
reported satisfaction with the resolution of their own legal problems.28  
The experience of one lawyer-less litigant was all too common.  When 
told by a trial court that he lacked a draft order that would authorize 
a referral to counseling, the man began asking questions about how to 
prepare the order. The judge responded, “I’m not your secretary,” 
and shoed the man out of the courtroom. 29 
Moreover, for some cases, such as uncontested divorces, lawyers 
may be contributing more to the problem than the solution.  In one 
survey of parents of young children represented by counsel in divorce 
proceedings, seventy-one percent felt that the legal process 
exacerbated hostility.30  Parents also felt that the role of the attorney 
contributed to conflict by pitting them against each other and 
“replacing direct communication with discussion filtered only through 
attorneys.”31  Other research finds that divorcing couples prefer 
simpler, less adversarial procedures, and that many pro se litigants do 
not hire lawyers for fear of intensifying conflict.32 
C. Doctrinal 
At the doctrinal level, problems also arise from courts’ expansive 
definitions of unauthorized practice of law (UPL) by non-lawyers and 
the restrictive standards for determining when court-appointed 
counsel is available.  The result has been to foreclose access to 
                                                                                                                                         
 26. Charn, supra note 18, at 2226. 
 27. See History of the Citizens Advice Service, CITIZENS ADVICE BUREAUS, 
http://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/index/aboutus/ourhistory.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 
2014). 
 28. ABA CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVICES AND THE PUBLIC, LEGAL NEEDS AND 
CIVIL JUSTICE: A SURVEY OF AMERICANS; MAJOR FINDINGS FROM THE 
COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 7–19 (1994). 
 29. Amanda Ripley, Who Needs Lawyers, TIME, June 12, 2000, at 62. 
 30. Marsha Kline Pruett & Tamara D. Jackson, The Lawyer’s Role During the 
Divorce Process: Perceptions of Parents, Their Young Children, and Their 
Attorneys, 33 FAM. L.Q. 283, 298 (1999). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Rebecca Aviel, Why Civil Gideon Won’t Fix Family Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2106, 
2117–18 (2013). 
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qualified non-lawyers, and to place on unrepresented litigants an 
unrealistic burden of showing that the absence of a lawyer makes a 
legal proceeding fundamentally unfair. 
A common feature of statutory and common-law prohibitions on 
unauthorized practice is their broad and ambiguous scope.  A number 
of jurisdictions simply prohibit, without defining, the practice of law 
by non-lawyers.33  Others take a circular approach and define the 
practice of law as what lawyers do.34  Some jurisdictions list conduct 
that is illustrative, such as providing legal advice, legal representation, 
and preparation of legal instruments, and then conclude with some 
amorphous catchall provision, such as “any action taken for others in 
any matter connected with the law.”35  On their face, these 
prohibitions encompass a wide range of common commercial activity.  
Many individuals, including accountants, financial advisors, real 
estate brokers, insurance agents, and even newspaper advice 
columnists could not give intelligent advice without reference to legal 
concerns.  Moreover, the ban on personalized assistance stands as a 
powerful barrier to competent low-cost providers.  Form-processing 
services, for example, may provide clerical help, but are prohibited 
from correcting  obvious errors or answering simple questions about 
where and when papers must be filed.36  A few decisions have even 
held that computerized document assistance programs such as 
LegalZoom constitutes the unauthorized practice of law because the 
on-line programs go beyond clerical support.37  Court clerks are also 
                                                                                                                                         
 33. See Susan D. Hoppock, Enforcing Unauthorized Practice of Law Prohibitions: 
The Emergence of the Private Cause of Action and its Impact on Effective 
Enforcement, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 719, 722 (2007); Deborah L. Rhode, Policing 
the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of 
Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 45 (1981); see also Hoppock, 
supra, at 722 n.35 (listing cases illustrating state courts’ reluctance to offer a 
definition). 
 34. Rhode, supra note 33, at 45 n.136. 
 35. Id. at 46 nn.140–42; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 9-401 (Supp. 1981). 
 36. See Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186, 1194 (Fla. 1978); Fifteenth 
Judicial Dist. Unified Bar Ass’n v. Glasgow, No. M1996-00020-COA-R3-CV, 1999 
WL 1128847, at *3–6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1999). 
 37. See, e.g., In re Reynoso, 477 F.3d 1117, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007); Unauthorized 
Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech. (Unauthorized Practice of Law), 179 F. 3d 
956 (5th Cir. 1999); Janson v. Legal Zoom.com (Janson), 802 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1069-
70 (W.D. Mo. 2011).  However, Unauthorized Practice of Law was overturned by a 
legislative exemption, and Janson was subsequently settled without banning the 
services altogether.  For further discussion, see Tom McNichol, Is LegalZoom’s Gain 
Your Loss?, CAL. LAW., Sept. 2010, at 20, available at http://www.callawyer.com/ 
clstory.cfm?eid=911404&ref=updates. 
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banned from giving advice to unrepresented parties.38  Some 
courthouses even have signs stating that clerks “can’t answer 
questions of a legal nature.”39  Yet as one California judge noted, 
those are the only questions that clerks generally encounter, other 
than “where is the restroom.”40 
Such expansive prohibitions ill serve the public interest.  Although 
courts repeatedly insist that broad prohibitions on unauthorized 
practice serve to protect the public, 41 support for that claim is often 
lacking.  In my recent review of ten years of reported UPL cases, less 
than a quarter mentioned specific evidence of public injury.42  In my 
survey of officials involved in UPL enforcement, two thirds could not 
recall a specific case of injury in the past year.43  Other research 
similarly casts doubt on the frequency of client injury.  The vast 
majority of UPL lawsuits filed against cyber lawyer products are 
brought by lawyers or unauthorized practice committees and 
generally settle without examples of harm.44 
Other nations permit non-lawyers to provide legal advice and assist 
with routine documents, and the evidence available does not suggest 
that their performance has been inadequate.45  In a study comparing 
outcomes for low-income clients in the United Kingdom on matters 
such as welfare benefits, housing, and employment, non-lawyers 
generally outperformed lawyers in terms of concrete results and client 
satisfaction.46  After reviewing their own and other empirical studies, 
the authors of that study concluded, “it is specialization, not 
                                                                                                                                         
 38. John M. Greacen, Clerk’s Office Staff Cannot Give Legal Advice?: What 
Does That Mean?, JUDGES J., Winter 1995, at 10, 10. 
 39. RHODE, supra note 3, at 83. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Tarpinian, 337 S.W.3d 627, 628–31 (Ky. 2011) (adopting and 
relying on Special Commissioner’s report); La. State Bar Ass’n v. Carr & Assocs., 15 
So. 3d 158, 165–67 (La. Ct. App. 2009). 
 42. Rhode & Ricca, supra note 22, at 15–16. 
 43. Id. at 12. 
 44. Mathew Rotenberg, Stifled Justice: The Unauthorized Practice of Law and 
Internet Legal Resources, 97 MINN. L. REV. 709, 722 (2012). 
 45. RHODE, supra note 3, at 89; Herbert Kritzer, Rethinking Barriers to Legal 
Practice, 81 JUDICATURE 100, 100–01 (1997) (discussing English Citizen’s Advice 
Bureaus with trained non lawyer volunteers); Julian Lonbay, Assessing the European 
Market for Legal Services: Developments in the Free Movement of Lawyers in the 
European Union, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1629, 1636 (2010) (discussing Swedish legal 
advice providers). 
 46. Richard Moorhead et al., Contesting Professionalism: Legal Aid and 
Nonlawyers in England and Wales, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 765, 785–86 (2003).  For 
discussion, see Deborah J. Cantrell, The Obligation of Legal Aid Lawyers to 
Champion Practice by Nonlawyers, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 883, 888–90 (2004). 
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professional status, which appears to be the best predictor of 
quality.”47  Ontario allows licensed paralegals to represent individuals 
in minor court cases and administrative tribunal proceedings, and a 
five-year review reported “solid levels of [public] satisfaction with the 
services received.”48 
In the United States, research on non-lawyer specialists who 
provide legal representation in bankruptcy and administrative agency 
hearings finds that they generally perform as well or better than 
attorneys.49  Extensive formal training is less critical than daily 
experience for effective advocacy.50  Yet existing unauthorized 
practice doctrine focuses only on whether the non-lawyer is providing 
legal assistance, not the quality of that assistance or the public injury 
that results. 
Further doctrinal problems arise from the restrictive standards that 
courts have established to determine rights to counsel in civil 
proceedings.51  The most recent authoritative case is the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Turner v. Rogers.52  Michael Turner had been 
jailed repeatedly for civil contempt for failure to make child support 
payments to Rebecca Rodgers, the mother of his child.53  Turner was 
unrepresented at his civil contempt hearings, and while serving a one-
year sentence, found a pro bono attorney to challenge the failure of 
the South Carolina state court to appoint counsel for him.54  In a 
unanimous decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the 
Due Process Clause did not entitle Turner to counsel.55  On certiorari, 
the United States Supreme Court applied a balancing test articulated 
in Mathews v. Eldridge, which requires consideration of  “(1) the 
nature of the ‘private interest that will be affected,’ (2) the 
comparative ‘risk’ of an ‘erroneous deprivation’ of that interest with 
and without ‘additional or substitute procedural safeguards,’ and (3) 
the nature and the magnitude of any countervailing interest in not 
                                                                                                                                         
 47. Moorhead et al., supra note 46, at 795. 
 48. DAVID B. MORRIS, ONTARIO MINISTRY OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., REPORT OF 
APPOINTEE’S FIVE-YEAR REVIEW OF PARALEGAL REGULATION IN ONTARIO 12 
(2012) 
 49. HERBERT KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY: LAWYERS AND NONLAWYERS AT 
WORK 148, 201 (1998). 
 50. Id. at 76, 108, 148, 190, 201. 
 51. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 2513. 
 54. Id. at 2514. 
 55. Id. 
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providing ‘additional or substitute requirement[s].’”56  After balancing 
these considerations, the majority concluded that despite the 
defendant’s strong liberty interest, the facts tipped against 
appointment of counsel.57  In so holding, the court stressed that the 
critical issue of the defendant’s ability to pay support was “sufficiently 
straightforward” and uncomplicated to be resolved without counsel; 
moreover, because Rogers was not represented, appointing counsel 
only for Turner could create an asymmetry that might unduly slow 
payment and make the proceedings “less fair overall.”58  The majority 
also believed that there was an alternative set of safeguards that could 
“significantly reduce the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty” 
without appointing counsel.59  These included giving notice that 
ability to pay child support is a key issue; asking defendants to fill out 
financial disclosure forms; allowing defendants to respond to 
questions about their finances; and making express findings regarding 
ability to pay.  Because Turner had been denied such protections, his 
conviction could not stand. 
The decision is problematic for several reasons. One is that the 
court provided no empirical evidence to support assertions about the 
complexity of procedures and fairness of alternatives.  Some 
commentators suggest that the Court’s analysis reveals a 
“breathtaking disconnect from the real world.”60  As Peter Edelman 
noted, “I don’t think the Court understands what it’s like to go into 
court without a lawyer.  It would be good for the whole lot of them to 
go and spend the day in landlord-tenant court and see if they have the 
same view.”61  How would an unrepresented litigant be able to 
establish that alternative procedures would lack fundamental fairness 
                                                                                                                                         
 56. Id. at 2517–18 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). 
 57. Id. at 2519–20 (“We consequently hold that the Due Process Clause does not 
automatically require the provision of counsel at civil contempt proceedings to an 
indigent individual who is subject to a child support order.”). 
 58. Id. at 2519. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Norman Reimer, Turner v. Rogers: The Right to Counsel Haunted by the 
Ghost of Gagnon, CONCURRING OPINIONS (June 27, 2011, 4:51 PM), http:// 
www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/06/turner-v-rogers-the-right-to-counsel-
haunted-by-the-ghost-of-gagnon.html; see also Russell Engler, Turner v. Rogers and 
the Essential Role of the Courts in Delivering Access to Justice, 7 HARV. LAW & 
POL’Y REV. 31, 41 (2013); Peter B. Edelman, Does the Supreme Court Get It in 
Turner?, CONCURRING OPINIONS (June 27, 2011), http://www.concurringopinions. 
com/archives/2011/06/does-the-supreme-court-get-it-in-turner.html. 
 61. Mark Walsh, A Sour Note from Gideon’s Trumpet: Playing the Blues for the 
Right of Counsel in Civil Cases, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 1, 2011), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/a_sour_note_from_gideons_trumpet. 
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or present an unacceptable risk of error?62  How much risk would be 
too much?63  Critics also noted that Turner faced more jail time for 
civil contempt than he would have served for criminal contempt, 
which would have required appointment of counsel.64 
Judith Resnik found still more fundamental problems with the 
Mathews balancing test that Turner applied; it serves 
to mask the lack of genuine empiricism.  Neither judges nor litigants 
can identify with any rigor the actual costs of various procedures, let 
alone model (or know) the impact in terms of false positives and 
negatives produced by the same, more or different processes . . . . 
While one can state the equation, one cannot do the math because 
the data are missing.65 
A further problem is that unrepresented litigants cannot ensure 
that the requisite procedural alternatives are installed.66  As Resnik 
notes, the trial judge in Turner “spent less than five minutes . . . made 
no findings on the record . . . and sent Turner to jail for twelve 
months,” which suggests the “inadequacies of the decider of fact” 
who would be responsible for procedural fairness.67  Absent some 
“public accounting and lawyer involvement, few mechanisms exist to 
police the fairness that Turner calls for.”68 
Moreover, the Mathews balancing test endorsed by Turner is not 
only flawed in theory; it has proven unworkable in practice.  
Vulnerable litigants in need of a lawyer’s assistance almost never 
succeed in persuading federal courts to provide it.69  Courts and 
legislatures have mandated counsel in civil cases only in extremely 
limited categories of matters, typically involving family, medical, and 
civil commitment issues.70  Judging from the caseloads of civil legal 
                                                                                                                                         
 62. Engler, supra note 60, at 54–56. 
 63. Id. at 56. 
 64. Walsh, supra note 61. 
 65. Judith Resnik, Comment, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. 
Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 158 
(2012) 
 66. See id. 
 67. Id. at 160. 
 68. Id. at 161. 
 69. See Houseman, supra note 24, at 16.  The litigation history of Civil Gideon is 
collected on the website of the coalition for a civil right to counsel. See Litigation, 
NAT’L COALITION FOR CIVIL RIGHT COUNCIL, http://www.civilrightocounsel.org/ 
advances/litigation (last visited Mar. 15, 2014). 
 70. See Laura K. Abel & Max Rettig, State Statutes Providing for a Right to 
Counsel in Civil Cases, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 245, 245 (2006); Clare Pastore, Life 
After Lassiter: An Over View of State-Court Right to Counsel Decisions, 40 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 186, 189–91 (2006). 
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aid programs, no right to counsel is available for about ninety-eight 
percent of cases that directly involve low-income parties.71  The 
process for selecting cases in which to guarantee counsel also seems 
idiosyncratic.  Why should individuals challenging voluntary 
vaccination orders or school attendance get a lawyer, but not 
individuals dealing with survival needs such as food, housing, medical 
benefits or protection from domestic violence?72  Even where lawyers 
are available, requirements of adequate experience, training and 
compensation are “more often than not . . . neither imposed nor 
satisfied.”73 
The denial of assistance to undocumented aliens imposes particular 
hardship.  Their frequent lack of language skills and understanding of 
American legal processes makes it difficult to proceed without legal 
assistance.  Yet only about a third of aliens, and ten percent of those 
in detention, have legal representation in immigration proceedings.74  
Programs funded by the federal Legal Services Corporation are 
prohibited from representing undocumented aliens.75 Although 
leading federal decisions authorize the appointment of counsel to 
prevent erroneous judgments, surveys cannot find a single 
immigration case in three decades where a noncitizen has been 
granted a lawyer.76 
D. Political 
A final set of barriers in the justice system is political.  The public is 
uninformed and unorganized on issues concerning access to justice 
and prefers options that bar organizations have been effective in 
opposing.77  Although the vast majority of Americans support 
provision of legal services to those who cannot afford it, four-fifths 
also incorrectly believe that the poor are entitled to counsel in civil 
                                                                                                                                         
 71. See Houseman, supra note 24, at 16. 
 72. See Abel & Rettig, supra note 70, at 246–48. 
 73. Id. at 248. 
 74. See Robert A. Katzman, The Legal Profession and the Unmet Needs of the 
Immigrant Poor, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 3, 7–8 (2008). 
 75. See 45 C.F.R. § 1626.3 (2013). 
 76. See, e.g., Aguilera-Enriquez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 516 F.2d 
565, 568–69 (6th Cir. 1975); THOMAS ALEXANDER ALIENIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION 
AND CITIZENSHIP 645 (5th ed. 2003). 
 77. For lawyers’ advantages over consumers in lobbying over matters such as 
anticompetitive licensing restrictions, see Larry E. Ribstein, Lawyers as Lawmakers: 
A Theory of Lawyer Licensing, 69 MISSOURI L. REV. 299, 314 (2004). 
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cases.78  Only a third think that low-income individuals would have 
difficulty finding legal assistance, a perception wildly out of touch 
with reality.79  On the rare occasions when its opinion has been 
solicited, four-fifths of the public also agreed that “many things that 
lawyers handle . . . can be done as well and less expensively by non-
lawyers.”80  Yet ordinary citizens lack adequate incentives to mobilize 
for reforms permitting access to such service providers.  Unlike health 
care, which is a crucial and continuing need, most Americans’ 
demands for legal assistance are much more episodic and more 
readily met, however imperfectly, by self-help. 
The obstacles to reform are especially formidable given the bar 
associations’ incentives and capacity for resistance.  No other 
occupation enjoys such prominence in all three branches of 
government.  As a result, the bar has traditionally been well-
positioned to block changes that might benefit the public at the 
profession’s expense.  The bar has repeatedly fought publication of 
self-help materials and opposed access to non-lawyer assistance.81  
The ABA is on record as supporting efforts to strengthen UPL 
prohibitions and over four-fifths of surveyed lawyers favor 
prosecution of independent paralegals for unauthorized practice.82  
The bar has also been concerned that “pro se court reform will spread 
upwards from the poor to the middle class and beyond.”83  And the 
courts, which enforce those prohibitions and control procedural 
                                                                                                                                         
 78. In a survey commissioned by the American Bar Association, fifty-five percent 
of respondents strongly agreed that it was essential that legal services be available; 
thirty-three percent somewhat agreed. ABA, Survey Summary: Economic Downturn 
and Access to Legal Resources (Apr. 20, 2009) (on file with author).  For the public’s 
belief about the right to counsel, see Johnson, supra note 8, at 393; see also ABA, 
PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. JUSTICE SYSTEM 63 (1999), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/marketresearch/PublicDocu
ments/perceptions_of_justice_system_1999_2nd_half.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 79. See ABA, supra note 78, at 63. 
 80. BARBARA CURRAN & F. SPAULDING, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC 231 
(1977).  The bar has not recently asked that question. 
 81. See Rhode, supra note 22, at 705.  For the Texas bar’s effort to ban a self-help 
computer software program, a decision that was overturned by the Texas legislature, 
see Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., No. Civ.A. 3:97CV-
2859H, 1999 WL 47235 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 1990), vacated and remanded, 179 F.3d 
956 (5th Cir. 1999).  For bar suits against Legal Zoom despite high rates of customer 
satisfaction, see generally Rhode & Ricca, supra note 22. 
 82. RHODE, supra note 3, at 88 (2004); see also James Podgers, Crumbling 
Fortress: Legal Profession Faces Rising Tide of Nonlawyer Practice, A.B.A. J., Dec. 
1993, at 51, 56 (1993). 
 83. Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed Counsel, 
Funding and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 994 (2012). 
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simplification and pro se assistance programs, have been unduly 
deferential to the bar on matters that affect its livelihood.84 
Political opposition from attorneys has also sabotaged efforts to 
mandate pro bono service.  Although bar leaders and ethical codes 
have long maintained that all lawyers share a professional 
responsibility to provide legal assistance to those who cannot afford 
it, proposals to put teeth into that obligation have been 
unceremoniously buried.85  Only one state, New York, requires 
service, and that requirement applies only to applicants to the bar.86  
In the absence of requirements, only thirty-six percent of American 
lawyers meet the aspirational standard of fifty hours of service 
annually that is codified in the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct.87  In the nation’s largest firms, less than half of the lawyers 
contribute even twenty hours a year.88 Given these participation 
levels, it is perhaps unsurprising that most attorneys resist campaigns 
to make service mandatory.  Only eight states even require lawyers to 
report their pro bono hours.89 
The inadequacy of bar involvement reflects a missed opportunity 
for the profession as well as the public.  Lawyers themselves benefit, 
both individually and collectively, from participation in public service.  
It can enhance their skills, contacts, reputation, and psychological 
well-being, as well as the professions’ public image.90 
                                                                                                                                         
 84. See BENJAMIN BARTON, THE LAWYER JUDGE BIAS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL 
PROFESSION 83 (2011); Benjamin Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the 
Interests of the Legal Profession? (Univ. of Tenn. Coll. of Law Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series No. 1, Oct. 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstaract= 
976478. 
 85. For the bar’s current recognition of lawyers’ pro bono responsibility, see 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (Discussion Draft 1983).  Bar ethical 
codes and efforts to require pro bono service are chronicled in Deborah L. Rhode, 
Pro Bono in Principle and in Practice 15–17 (Stanford Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory Working Paper Series No. 66, June 2003). 
 86. The New York rule requires fifty hours of unpaid work as a condition of 
admission. See Mosi Secret, Judge Details a Rule Requiring Pro Bono Work by 
Aspiring Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2012, at A25. 
 87. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (Discussion Draft 1983); ABA 
STANDING COMM. ON PRO BONO AND PUBLIC SERV., SUPPORTING JUSTICE III: A 
REPORT ON THE PRO BONO WORK OF AMERICA’S LAWYERS 5 (2013). 
 88. Only forty-four percent performed at least twenty hours of service. See Where 
the Recession Lingers, AM. LAW., June 2013, at 47. 
 89. State by State Pro Bono Service Rules, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/ 
proups/probono_public_service/policy/state-ethic-rules.html (last visited Mar. 15, 
2014). 
 90. See Rhode, supra note 85, at 16. 
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II.  REFORM STRATEGIES 
Despite these political obstacles, there is reason to hope that some 
progress is possible on access to justice.  First, the increasing public 
interest in do-it-yourself publications and services and the increasing 
volume of pro se litigants has created corresponding pressure for 
reform.91  As Russell Engler notes, attitudes toward the role of judges 
and court clerks concerning unrepresented parties have “undergone a 
sea change over the past fifteen years.”92  About half the states have 
access to justice commissions, and a consortium of law professors 
recently formed to support research and teaching initiatives on access 
issues.93  The State of Washington has enacted a licensing system for 
trained paralegals who can offer limited services, and New York and 
California are considering proposals for similar systems.94  Bar efforts 
to crack down on self-help software have triggered legislative 
reversal.95  The ABA has abandoned its attempt to promulgate a 
restrictive definition of unauthorized practice of law after protest by 
the Justice Department, the Federal Trade Commission, and its own 
antitrust division concerning the anticompetitive consequences of 
such changes.96  California and Massachusetts have launched pilot 
projects to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of guaranteeing the right to 
counsel in specified circumstances.97  An ABA Task Force on Legal 
Education has recommended a licensing system for paralegals to 
provide routine legal services.98  Never has there been a more 
receptive climate for access to justice issues. 
                                                                                                                                         
 91. For example, LegalZoom has served over two million customers since its 
founding and has shown annual revenue of $156 million. Anthony Ha, Legal Zoom 
Files for $120 M IPO: Saw $156M in Revenues Last Year, TECH CRUNCH (May 11, 
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DAILY J., Apr. 11, 2013, at 1. 
 95. See Rhode, supra note 93, at 543. 
 96. See id. 
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 98. ABA TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUC., DRAFT REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 12–13, 27 (2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
administrative/professional_responsibility/taskforcecomments/task_force_on_legaled
ucation_draft_report_september2013.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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Significant progress will require strategies on four levels. First, we 
need to maximize opportunities for self-help and assistance from 
service providers less expensive than lawyers.  A second strategy 
should focus on ways to match cases with the most cost-effective 
providers, and to ensure access to lawyers in cases involving 
fundamental interests that cannot be effectively addressed in other 
ways.  A third strategy should involve research to assess different 
methods of assistance and to gain a better understanding of what 
works best for whom in what circumstances.99  A final strategy should 
ensure more education of the public and the profession about the 
need for reform. 
A. Self-Help and Non-lawyer Service Providers 
The first strategy is already well underway.  Courts around the 
country are implementing reform efforts to accommodate pro se 
litigants.100  These litigants are often particularly vulnerable; they are 
disproportionately poor, and unfamiliar with legal proceedings, and 
many face barriers of language literacy, and education.101  They need 
what Richard Zorza has termed “The Self-Help Friendly Court.”102  
This court would seek to reduce complexity, utilize technology, and 
train judges and staff in assisting litigants.103  Models for this kind of 
court are increasingly available.  The American Judicature Society 
and the National Center for State Courts have published guides to 
make legal proceedings more fair and accessible to parties without 
lawyers.104  The Self-Represented Litigation Network has also 
published materials compiling best practices and innovative 
approaches.105  Some court systems have established special 
magistrate courts for pro se cases, or employed staff attorneys to 
assist pro se litigants.106  Others have hot lines, pro se clerks’ offices, 
                                                                                                                                         
 99. Charn, supra note 18, at 2232. 
 100. See Barton & Bibas, supra note 83, at 987–90. 
 101. See Engler, supra note 23, at 79. 
 102. RICHARD ZORZA, THE NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, THE SELF-HELP 
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WITHOUT LAWYERS (2002). 
 103. Engler, supra note 60, at 57–58. 
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 105. THE SELF-REPRESENTED LITIG. NETWORK, CORE MATERIALS ON SELF-
REPRESENTED LITIGATION INNOVATION (2006). 
 106. For the New York magistrate court, see Lois Bloom & Helen Hershkoff, 
Federal Courts, Magistrate Judges and the Pro Se Plaintiff, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 475, 493–97 (2002).  For the San Antonio staff attorney 
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“lawyer-of-the-day’-programs,” and self-help centers.107  However, all 
of these strategies assume a commitment to making courts more 
accessible—a commitment that has sometimes been lagging.108  And 
in many jurisdictions, severe financial constraints and recent 
budgetary cutbacks have compounded the challenge of funding 
adequate pro se services.109  Surmounting those obstacles will require 
more evaluation and exposure of inaccessible systems, more resources 
for innovation, and more ways to hold the courts accountable.110 
Americans would also benefit from more effective channels of 
informal dispute resolution, not only in courthouses, but also in 
neighborhood, workplace and commercial settings.  Considerable 
evidence suggests that well–designed employee and consumer 
grievance procedures benefit both business and individual 
participants, and that most people prefer to resolve disputes through 
informal, out-of court processes.111  Businesses over a certain size 
could be given incentives to institutionalize such dispute resolution 
processes, and reforms could be mandated for arbitration and 
mediation procedures that are now skewed against weaker parties.112 
The United States also needs changes in unauthorized practice 
doctrine and enforcement, as well as licensing systems for paralegals 
that would increase access to low-cost services.  Charges of 
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unauthorized practice should only be brought in cases of 
demonstrated consumer injury.  Judges should follow the lead of 
courts that have weighed the public interest in determining whether 
to ban unauthorized practice.  For example, the Colorado Supreme 
Court upheld a system enabling non-lawyers to represent claimants in 
unemployment proceedings; the Court reasoned that lay 
representation has been accepted by the public for fifty years and 
“poses no threat to the People of the State of Colorado. Nor is it 
interfering with the proper administration of justice.  No evidence was 
presented to the contrary.”113  Similarly, the Washington State 
Supreme Court, after considering factors such as cost, availability of 
services, and consumer convenience, concluded that it was in the 
public’s interest for licensed real estate brokers to fill in standard 
form agreements.114  Such a consumer-oriented approach would allow 
for a more socially defensible regulatory structure than conventional 
bans on non-lawyer practice irrespective of its quality and cost-
effectiveness. 
Licensing systems could also be developed to allow qualified non-
lawyers to offer personalized assistance on routine matters.  
Consumer protections could be required concerning qualifications, 
disclaimers, ethical standards, malpractice insurance, and discipline.115  
Many administrative agencies already have the power to regulate 
non-lawyers appearing before them, and no evidence suggests that 
these frameworks have been inadequate or that agencies have more 
disciplinary problems with non-lawyers than lawyers.116  Under their 
inherent powers, courts could oversee the development of such 
licensing systems or approve legislatively authorized structures as 
consistent with the public interest.  A number of jurisdictions, 
including New York and California, are considering licensing 
frameworks, and Washington has implemented one for certain 
specialties.117  If the goal is to protect clients from incompetence, 
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rather than lawyers from competition, then regulation—not 
prohibition—of lay specialists makes sense. 
Such a regulatory system would be particularly beneficial in the 
immigration area, a field characterized by both pervasive fraud and 
pervasive unmet needs.118  Individuals holding themselves out as 
notaries and immigration consultants have preyed on the ignorance of 
undocumented consumers who cannot afford attorneys and are 
reluctant to approach authorities to complain about fraudulent 
services.  Many of these consultants capitalize on the status of notario 
publicos in some Latin American countries, where these legal 
professionals enjoy formal legal training and authority to provide 
legal assistance.119  The situation would benefit from a licensing 
structure similar to those in Australia, Canada, and the United 
Kingdom, which allow licensed non-lawyer experts to provide 
immigration-related assistance. 120  Although the United States allows 
accredited non-lawyers to represent individuals in immigration 
appeals, it permits only representatives who work for nonprofit 
organizations and who accept only nominal fees for their efforts.121  
An expanded licensing system that would allow qualified lay experts 
to charge reasonable fees could expand access to justice for a 
population in great need of assistance.122 
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In short, the current structure is both under-enforced and over-
inclusive.  Bar prohibitions encompass a sweeping array of 
competent, low- cost services.  Yet strong consumer demand for such 
assistance makes these prohibitions difficult to enforce.  As a result, 
most lay practice goes unregulated, and when abuses occur, as in the 
immigration context, the public has inadequate remedies. A 
preferable regulatory structure would provide both less and more 
protection—less for attorneys and more for consumers. 
B. Right to Counsel in Civil Cases 
Not only do we need to increase less expensive options than 
attorneys, we also need systems to match clients with appropriate 
service providers and to ensure provision of lawyers where other 
options are inadequate.123  The right to counsel (a Civil Gideon) 
should depend on whether fundamental interests are at issue and 
whether a lawyer’s assistance is critical to ensure fundamental 
fairness.124  In identifying fundamental interests, a starting point for 
analysis is the American Bar Association’s resolution in favor of 
appointing counsel in areas of  “basic human need,” defined as 
shelter, sustenance, safety, health and child custody. 125  In 
determining fundamental fairness, courts and legislatures should 
consider the complexity of the procedures and the power relations 
between the parties. 
The right to counsel is compelling in principle, but challenging in 
practice.  Over eighty years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized 
that an individual’s “right to be heard [in legal proceedings] would be, 
in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be 
heard by counsel.”126  Access to an attorney is often critical to the rule 
of law and social justice.  In contexts involving fundamental needs, 
the stakes for parties will often be more substantial than the 
possibility of brief imprisonment for a misdemeanor, where counsel is 
already mandated.127  The United States lags behind the forty-nine 
countries in the Council of Europe, as well as other nations such as 
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Canada, Japan, India and Australia that have recognized a right to 
counsel in at least some civil cases.128 
What stands in the way is money.  America’s experience in 
attempting to fund a right to counsel in criminal cases is not 
encouraging.  In many jurisdictions, staggering caseloads and 
shockingly inadequate fees have made effective representation 
impossible.129  Given the current constraints on state and local 
budgets, funding for a civil right to counsel may fare no better.  In 
jurisdictions that now appoint lawyers for defendants in child support 
cases, inadequate time and resources often prevent effective 
assistance.130  A related concern is that extending the civil right to 
counsel “will compete with other rights to counsel, spreading funding 
ever thinner.”131 
Addressing these problems will require government funding 
adequate to meet the demands of those who need legal assistance, but 
cannot realistically afford it.  What constitutes “need” and 
“affordability” is of course open to dispute, but by almost any 
standard our current system falls far short.132  Most European nations 
guarantee legal assistance for a much broader category of individuals 
than those entitled to legal aid in the American system.  American 
individuals that are entitled to legal aid are those below or just above 
the official poverty line.133  Examples of the eligibility criterion in 
other countries include: 
• Does the claim have a reasonable chance of success? 
• What would be the benefits of legal assistance or the harms if it is 
unavailable? 
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• Would a reasonable lawyer, advising a reasonable client, suggest 
that the client use his or her own money to pursue the issue?134 
These nations’ eligibility structures remedy a major limitation of 
the United States model, which excludes many individuals with 
urgent problems and no realistic means of addressing them.135   
Although such a structure would require more funding, it would also 
have more political appeal than current programs because it would 
benefit more than just low-income communities. 
Subsidies for an expanded system could also come from various 
financial sources likely to command greater political support than 
general tax revenues.  Examples include a small progressive tax on 
law-related revenues, a surcharge on court filing fees based on the 
amount in controversy, and more contexts permitting fee awards to 
prevailing parties.136  In a nation that spends over $90 billion annually 
on private legal fees, a modest one percent tax would raise $900 
million, which would almost triple the current federal budget for legal 
aid.137 
An equitable and cost-effective legal aid system would also operate 
without the restrictions on activities that now accompany government 
subsidies.  Legal services programs that receive federal funds may not 
use that money, and in some instances may not use any other revenue 
for a broad range of matters including school desegregation, abortion, 
political redistricting, welfare reform, and clients who are 
undocumented aliens or prison inmates.138  Nor may these programs 
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engage in activities such as lobbying, community organizing, class 
actions, or representation in legislative and administrative rulemaking 
proceedings.139  Since these are the very strategies that may be most 
likely to address the causes of legal problems and to deter future 
abuses, legal aid programs have faced an unpalatable choice.  They 
can do without federal funds and help far fewer individual clients, but 
in a more effective fashion.  Conversely, they can handle more cases, 
but only for politically acceptable clients, and in ways less likely to 
promote real change.140  This is a choice we should not require.  
Legislators who have demanded such restrictions are attempting to 
accomplish indirectly what they have unable to do directly: curtail 
rights and social services benefiting the least popular of the poor.  
These actions are unworthy of a nation committed to equal justice 
under law. 
C. Pro Bono Service 
Another obvious way to increase access to legal counsel is to 
require pro bono contributions from lawyers.  It is a professional 
disgrace that most American lawyers cannot manage even an hour a 
week on pro bono service.141  We can and must do better.  Fifty hours 
a year, the current aspirational standard, should be mandatory, with a 
financial buyout option for those who lack the time or inclination for 
service.  Buyout contributions could go to support designated legal 
aid providers.  Such a requirement, calling for less than one hour a 
week of service or the financial equivalent, hardly justifies the 
overblown descriptions advanced by critics of mandatory service: 
“latent fascism,” “economic slavery,” and “involuntary servitude.”142 
The rationale for a pro bono requirement is straightforward.  
Because access to law so often requires access to lawyers, they bear a 
particular responsibility to help make legal services available.  As 
courts and bar ethical codes have long noted, the state grants lawyers 
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special privileges that impose special obligations.143  As officers of the 
court, lawyers bear some responsibility for ensuring fundamental 
fairness in its processes.144  As long as lawyers occupy such a central 
role in our justice system, there is particular value in exposing them to 
how that system functions, or fails to function, for the have-nots.  
Additionally, 
Pro bono work offers many attorneys their only direct contact with 
what passes for justice among the poor. Giving broad segments of 
the bar some experience with poverty-related problems and public 
interest causes can lay crucial foundations for change.  [For 
example,] pro bono programs have often launched social reform 
initiatives and strengthened support for government subsidies of 
legal aid.145 
Mandating pro bono service would benefit the profession as well as 
the public.  Volunteer service offers ways to gain additional skills, 
trial experience, and community contacts.  Such career development 
opportunities, in the service of causes to which attorneys are 
committed, are often their most rewarding professional experiences.146  
Many lawyers report that they would like to do more pro bono work 
but are in institutions that do not support it.147  ABA surveys find that 
young lawyers’ greatest source of dissatisfaction in practice is its lack 
of connection to the public good.148  Pro bono service can supply that 
connection. 
In the absence of a requirement for pro bono service, more efforts 
could be made to encourage voluntary contributions.  More courts 
and bar associations should require lawyers to report their pro bono 
assistance, and more clients should consider lawyers’ pro bono 
involvement when selecting counsel.  For example, California 
legislation requires pro bono contributions as a condition of any state 
contract for legal services exceeding $50,000.149  Organizations such as 
the ABA Standing Committee on Pro Bono and Public Service could 
publish directories with information concerning employers’ pro bono 
policies and contributions.  They could also develop best the practices 
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and publicize lists of employers who certify that they are in 
compliance.  These practices could include: 
• adoption of a formal pro bono policy that gives credit for pro 
bono work toward billable hour requirements; 
• a visible commitment by the organization’s leadership; 
• consideration of pro bono service as a favorable factor in 
performance evaluations and in promotion and compensation 
decisions; 
• requirements of compliance with the ABA Model Rules standard 
of fifty hours of service per year or the financial equivalent; 
• adequate opportunities for service, and adequate supervision and 
training; 
• recognition and showcasing of service.150 
Greater efforts could also be made to target particular groups of 
lawyers whose services have been underutilized, such as retired 
lawyers and legal academics.151  And bar associations could offer 
back-up assistance, free malpractice insurance, and continuing 
education credit for pro bono training.  Whatever the strategy, the 
objective should be to insure a closer match between the profession’s 
rhetorical and actual commitment to public service. 
D. Unbundled Services and Innovative Delivery Structures 
Another way of expanding access to counsel is through unbundled 
legal services.  Under this approach, lawyers provide assistance on 
discrete legal tasks, such as advice, negotiation, ghostwriting, 
document preparation, or court appearances, rather than full 
representation.152  In one ABA poll, two-thirds of potential clients 
would like to have a conversation about unbundling, and two-thirds 
said lawyers’ willingness to provide unbundled services would be 
important to their decision about who to engage.153  Courts can 
encourage this trend by allowing lawyers to submit ghostwritten 
pleadings and to limit their liability for specified tasks as long as the 
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limitation is reasonable and clients give informed consent.154  To make 
such representation more accessible, lawyers could follow the lead of 
initiatives such as the coffee chain, Legal Grind, which dispenses brief 
advice along with cappuccino and self-help materials.155  To increase 
demand for such services, more state bars could also establish 
unbundled or “low bono” referral programs that match clients of 
limited means to lawyers willing to provide reduced-fee assistance.156 
E. Research 
A major obstacle to increasing access to justice is the lack of 
research on key issues.  For example, methodologically sound studies 
on the contributions of lawyers in routine cases are scarce and 
conflicting.157  Researchers using randomized control groups have 
come to different conclusions as to whether lawyers improve 
outcomes.158  Moreover, short-term outcomes are not the only, or 
                                                                                                                                         
 154. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (Discussion Draft 1983) 
(providing for limited representation); see also Mosten, Unbundling Legal Services: 
Servicing Clients Within Their Ability to Pay, supra note 152, at 18 (proposing civil 
immunity for lawyers); Margaret Graham Tebo, Loosening Ties: Unbundling of 
Legal Services Can Open Door to New Clients, 89 A.B.A. J. 35, 35 (2003) (noting 
state rules). 
 155. See e.g., Carol J. Williams, Another Sign of Tough Times: Legal Aid for the 
Middle Class, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2009, at 6. 
 156. Kathryn Alfisi, Low Bono Widens Path to Access to Justice, WASH. LAW., 
Sept. 2013, at 24; Deborah L. Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice, 42 
LOY. L. A. L. REV. 869, 898–99 (2009). 
 157. See Laura K. Abel, Evidence-Based Access to Justice, 13 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 295, (2010) (describing conflicting outcomes); Barton & Bibas, supra note 
83, at 991 (noting scarcity of credible data and conflicting findings); Charn, supra note 
18, at 2222 (noting that we lack “empirical evidence that would support confident 
advice to claimants about what assistance would best meet their needs”); Engler, 
supra note 23, at 69–73 (noting lack of evaluation of pro se assistance on case 
outcomes and problems in using satisfaction as a measure of success for hotlines and 
self help programs); Engler, supra note 92, at 52–53 (noting the “shortage of solid, 
reliable data concerning which types of legal assistance various types of litigants need 
to obtain meaningful access” (internal quotation marks omitted)); D. James Greiner 
& Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What 
Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make, 121 YALE L.J. 2118 
(2012) (discussing methodological weaknesses of many studies and conflicting 
results); Resnik, supra note 65, at 158 (noting that neither judges nor litigants have 
the basis for knowing “whether adding lawyers would enhance accuracy”); Rhode, 
supra note 93 at 538–39 (2013) (discussing scarcity of data and conflicting results); 
Hadfield, supra note 8, at 129 (noting “slim empirical basis” for evaluating a lawyer’s 
performance). 
 158. See D. James Greiner et al., The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance: A 
Randomized Study in a Massachusetts District Court and Prospects for the Future, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 901, 928 (2013) (finding tenants with access to lawyer fared better 
than those who were randomly assigned to information and self help). Compare 
2014] ACCESS TO JUSTICE 1253 
necessarily the most important, measures of impact.  We know almost 
nothing about the long-term consequences of appointing counsel.  For 
example, how much does winning a landlord-tenant case help in terms 
of stabilizing a party’s living situation or producing improvements in 
building conditions?159  Are there better uses of lawyers’ time?  Could 
they do more to prevent homelessness by focusing more on policy and 
organizing efforts and less on individual representation?  We also 
know almost nothing about the value of unbundled legal services.160  
And we lack adequate data about various self-help strategies such as 
hotlines and pro se clinics.  Assessing long-term impacts is critical in 
evaluating the relative cost- effectiveness of particular forms of 
assistance. 
We also need more evaluation of the quality and social impact of 
pro bono representation.  All too often, lawyers assume that any work 
done pro bono is pro bono; “representation is taken as a good in and 
of itself, regardless of cost effectiveness.”161  In the only recent survey 
of law firms’ pro bono programs, no firms made any formal efforts to 
assess the social impact of their work or the satisfaction of clients and 
non-profit partners that referred cases.162  Many firms operate with a 
“spray and pray” approach: they spread services widely and hope that 
something good will come of them.163  Although something good 
usually does result, this is not necessarily the best use of resources.  
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Nor do good intentions necessarily ensure good results.  On one of 
the rare occasions when someone asked about the quality of pro bono 
work, almost half of public interest legal organizations reported 
problems with the assistance that they obtained from outside firms.164 
Ensuring that pro bono resources are used most effectively will 
require research within and across institutions.  Firms should collect 
standardized data on the amount and types of services provided, the 
outcomes obtained, and the satisfaction of clients and public interest 
partners.165  Such data should be publicly available to hold providers 
accountable for their performance and also to monitor the adequacy 
of the system as a whole.  Only through systematic research can we 
identify the legal needs that fall through the cracks and the quality 
concerns that should be addressed. 
F. Legal Education 
Legal education should do more to promote access to justice both 
by supporting research and by integrating those issues into the 
curriculum and programmatic activities.  Currently, the topic is 
missing or marginal in the traditional core curriculum.166  Even 
professional responsibility courses, which are logical forums for these 
issues, typically focus on the law of lawyering and omit broader 
questions about the distribution of legal services.167  In one national 
survey, only one percent of law school graduates recalled coverage of 
pro bono obligations in their professional responsibility class or 
orientation program.168  Although many legal clinics offer some 
firsthand exposure to what passes for justice among low-income 
communities, not all students take these courses.  And given the need 
to provide both skills training and knowledge of relevant substantive 
and procedural law, not all clinics will have adequate time to devote 
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to structural problems and reforms in the delivery of legal services.169  
To address these gaps, schools should offer at least one specialized 
course on access to justice and should encourage integration of the 
topic into the core curriculum. 
Given the profession’s aspiration that all lawyers should provide 
pro bono services, all law schools should lay the foundation for that 
commitment.  A decade ago, a commission of the Association of 
American Law Schools recommended that every institution “make 
available for every student at least one well-supervised pro bono 
opportunity and either require participation or find ways to attract 
the great majority of students to volunteer.”170  We remain a 
considerable distance from that goal. Only a small minority of schools 
require pro bono work, fewer still impose specific obligations on 
faculty, and in many institutions, the amounts required are minimal.171  
Although other schools have voluntary programs, their scope and 
supervision are sometimes open to question, and many students still 
graduate without pro bono work as part of the educational 
experience.172  Legal education could do better, and models are 
available that could be widely replicated.  An example is the Roger 
Williams Law School Pro Bono Collaborative, where faculty 
members oversee some thirty initiatives involving students, non-profit 
organizations, and pro bono attorneys who assist low-income 
individuals.173 
The American Bar Association’s Council on Legal Education and 
Admission to the Bar should also do more to support such initiatives.  
Its standards for accreditation call on law schools to encourage 
students to participate in pro bono activities and provide 
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opportunities for them to do so.174  But enforcement of these 
standards has had little teeth.175  The ABA should require schools to 
require pro bono service and to include access to justice issues in the 
core curriculum.176 
Legal education should also do more to educate the public about 
these issues.  As noted earlier, much of the problem concerning access 
to justice stems from the lack of public recognition that there is a 
significant problem.177  Not only do most Americans believe 
incorrectly that the poor already have a right to appointed counsel, 
they also believe the nation has too much litigation.178  Such 
perceptions make increased budgets for legal services a low priority.  
Academics need to do more writing for non-academic audiences and 
to put a human face on legal needs. 
CONCLUSION 
The ideal of equal justice is deeply embedded in American legal 
traditions and routinely violated in daily legal practices.  Our nation 
prides itself on its commitment to the rule of law, but prices it out of 
reach for millions of its citizens.  Primary control over the legal 
process rests with the profession that has the least stake in reducing 
its expense. 
Over three decades ago, then-President Jimmy Carter noted that 
the United States had “the heaviest concentration of lawyers on 
earth . . . but no resource of talent and training . . . is more wastefully 
or unfairly distributed than legal skills.  Ninety percent of our lawyers 
serve ten percent of our people.  We are overlawyered and 
                                                                                                                                         
 174. ABA, STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW 
SCHOOLS 2013–2014, at 21–22 (2013). 
 175. Schools are not required to disclose their efforts to encourage pro bono 
assistance, the number of students who participate in pro bono activities, or the 
extent of their involvement. 
 176. The ABA already requires that schools provide instruction in the “rules and 
responsibilities of the legal profession and its members.” See generally ABA, supra 
note 174.  Rule 6.1 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct recognizes 
enhancing access to justice as such a responsibility. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 6.1 (“Every lawyer has a professional responsibility to provide legal 
services to those unable to pay.”). 
 177. See supra notes 20–22. 
 178. For public misperceptions about the right to counsel, see David G. Savage, 
The Race to the White House: A Trial Lawyer on Ticket Has Corporate U.S. Seeing 
Red, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2004, at 1 (noting that eighty percent of Americans believe 
that there is too much litigation); supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
2014] ACCESS TO JUSTICE 1257 
underrepresented.”179  The situation has not improved.  And at least 
part of the problem is of the profession’s own making.  Our nation 
does not lack for lawyers.180  Nor does it lack for ideas of how to make 
legal services more accessible.  The challenge remaining is to learn 
more about what strategies work best, and to make them a public and 
a professional priority.  If our nation is truly committed to equal 
justice under law, we must do more to translate that rhetorical 
aspiration into daily reality. 
                                                                                                                                         
 179. Jimmy Carter, President of the United States, Remarks at the 100th 
Anniversary Luncheon of the Los Angeles County Bar Association, 64 A.B.A. J. 840, 
842 (1978). 
 180. Over the past four decades, the number of lawyers has approximately 
quadrupled. THOMAS MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 81 (2010). 
